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Abstract
In a variety of recent papers, researchers have found that interest rate behaviour approximately
follows a Taylor rule. From this they have concluded that the central bank is following a Taylor rule
as its monetary policy reaction function. We show that such interest rate behaviour results when
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2I Introduction
In the past few years the view has commonly been expressed that central banks
follow `Taylor Rules', that is that they set interest rates in response to deviations of
in°ation from target and of output from its natural rate, with or without a lagged
interest rate term.1 Such rules were ¯rst promulgated by Bryant et al. [1993], and
in particular Henderson and McKibbin [1993] in a Brookings study of multi-lateral
models and of the properties of di®erent monetary rules in the face of stochastic sim-
ulations; subsequently John Taylor [1993] gave them a wide airing as an appropriate
way to formulate monetary policy in a world where the money demand relationships
had become unstable. Since then he and other authors have ¯tted single equations
of this type to explain the behaviour of interest rates in the US and a variety of
other countries in recent years; the general suggestion has been that they explained
this central bank behaviour in recent years well enough for us to believe that this in
fact was what central banks were doing.2; 3 In this paper we consider whether this
evidence should be persuasive.
We show that the appearance of such an interest rate rule- a `pseudo-Taylor rule'-
can be created by a standard macro model in which actually a money supply rule
is operating with no interest rate feedback- i.e, where there is in fact no Taylor rule
operating at all. The pseudo-rule is implied by the model under a money supply rule,
as a correlative relation (not a reduced form as all the arguments are endogenous
3variables). Hence an interest equation does not identify a (structural) Taylor rule; a
Taylor rule and a pseudo-rule are `observationally equivalent' to use the expression
coined by Thomas Sargent (1976).4 In otherwords just because it appears ex post that
Central Banks are following a monetary policy rule of the type outlined by Taylor,
does not necessarily mean that they are ex ante. This is not altogether surprising
since Taylor originally suggested that he had justi¯ed his rule as an approximation
to the behaviour of interest rates in a ¯xed money supply regime with stable money
demand; hence it could be used to `replicate' that interest rate behaviour where the
money supply could not be targeted. This might be sensible operational advice to
central banks; but it does not follow that when interest rate behaviour of this sort is
observed therefore central banks are actually following such rules. They could just
as well be setting the money supply under conditions of stable money demand.
It might be said that it is commonly observed that central banks do actually
set interest rates rather than ¯x the money supply (or the monetary base); they
even announce interest rates they will adhere to over the coming month. However
we would point out that while this is certainly true of many if not all central banks,
these practices allow market rates some latitude within the month around the set level
and over the period of a quarter, which is the usual unit of our macro observations,
they may change the interest rate set frequently; if they do so in order to hit a money
supply target, this behaviour could be close to setting the money supply in a quarterly
4framework.
It might be thought that perhaps it does not matter whether they follow a Taylor
rule or a money supply rule that gives rise to a Taylor pseudo-rule. But we show
in an appendix that, as a moment's re°ection would reveal and indeed the earlier
Brookings study showed in detail, a money supply rule and a (structural) Taylor
rule produce quite di®erent stochastic behaviour in the macro economy. Thus it does
make a serious di®erence and does remain a matter still to be determined whether one
or other type of behaviour does the better job in welfare terms- contrary to a recent
study [Clarida et al. 1999] which called Taylor rules the modern `science of monetary
policy', thereby suggesting that other rules are essentially inferior, even irrelevant.
Thus it remains an open question whether such rules are appropriate from a welfare
viewpoint; and in this note we conclude that the `evidence' of single equation studies
is unpersuasive that central banks actually follow them.
Our benchmark framework, as in McCallum and Nelson [1998, 1999] and Clarida
et al. [1999] is a dynamic general equilibrium model with money, as explained in
section II; this can be recast approximately as an IS/LM/Phillips curve model. A
key di®erence of such a model from the traditional IS-LM framework, is that, these
equations are derived from optimising behaviour. It also embeds nominal overlapping
wage contracts as pioneered by Phelps and Taylor [1977] for which a rationale can
be found in insurance against shocks given indexation imperfections [e.g. Minford et
5al, 1999]. Section III highlights the problem of identi¯cation with interest rate rules.
The ¯nal section summarises our main conclusions.
II Theoretical Structure
Consider an economy populated by identical in¯nitely lived agents that produce
a single good as output which can be used both for consumption and investment.
The Representative Household
In a stochastic environment the consumer maximises his expected utility subject















; 0 < ¯ < 1 (1)
where ¯ is the discount factor, Ct is consumption (composite good which includes
foreign consumption) in period `t', Lt is the amount of leisure time consumed in
period `t', Mt
Pt is real money balances held in period `t', and Et is the mathemati-
cal expectations operator.5 We assume that the utility function is well behaved and
satis¯es Inada-type conditions. The representative household's budget constraint is
given by
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6where wtNt is labour income, Cd
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t are foreign and domestic price level respectively. Sht and dt are shares and
dividend income and ª is a risk-premium term that re°ects temporary departures
from uncovered interest parity.6 Furthermore, each agent is endowed with a ¯xed
amount of time which can be spent for leisure Lt or work Nt. Ht (total endowment
of time) is normalised to unity in what follows.
The Representative Household's Optimisation problem
We assume that the functional form of u(¢) is separable and of the form7
u(¢) = µ0(1 ¡ ¾0)
¡1C
(d)1¡¾0
t + µ1(1 ¡ ¾1)
¡1C
(f)1¡¾1








where µ0, µ1, !, ¾0, ¾1, ´, ½ Â 0. The ¯rst-order conditions for the house-
hold's optimal choice problem for real money balances (after invoking the Fisher
equation) provides justi¯cation for a money demand function of the form (in natural
logarithms):8
logMt ¡ logPt ' °0 + °1Et logC
(d)
t+1 + °2Rt (3)
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where we have used the approximation logEtC
(d)
t+1 ' Et logC
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t+1.11, 12 Similarly the

















Note that in an open economy, the household has an additional choice variable,
C
f
t . Equation (4.1) implies the existence of a demand function for imports, whose
arguments are the real exchange rate (Qt), (future) consumption of domestic goods
(C
(d)












; h1(¢) < 0; h2(¢) < 0; h3(¢) > 0 (4.2)
We assume that in the rest of the world a parallel maximisation exercise has taken
place with a typical foreign households' preferences described by the utility function
u¤(¢) = µ0(1 ¡¾0)
¡1C
(d¤)1¡¾0
t + µ1(1 ¡¾1)
¡1C
(f¤)1¡¾1








where (*) denotes rest of the world. Since C
f¤
t = Xt (home country exports), the
foreign sector's maximising behaviour will have produced a decision rule analogous to
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t+1 are exogenous. The representative household's lifetime budget con-
straint (given that all output (GDP) except government expenditure and investment






































Y t ¡ Gt ¡ It
¢
where `g' denotes steady state growth of consumption, r?
t is long-run interest rate,
and Y t; Gt; and It denote steady state values for output, government expenditure, and
investment expenditure respectively (we assume that net exports are zero in steady
state). Leading the above equality one-period (expressing it in natural logarithms)
and taking expectations at time `t' yields a variable made up of slow-moving steady
state elements.
Et logCt+1 ´ log e Ct+1 = log(¾0 ¡ ¯) ¡ log¾0 + log
¡
















9Finally using the (open) economy's overall resource constraint Yt = Cd
t +It+Gt+
Xt (the government and household budget constraint together gives us the market
clearing condition which is expressed in natural logarithms), we can recast the log-
linearised consumption and money demand equation's as (open-economy) IS and LM
curve respectively (see McCallum and Nelson, [1999]) which is used in the appendix.
















t and ¢ denotes
the ¯rst di®erence operator. Then using the ¯rst-order conditions for the household's
optimal choice problem for domestic and foreign bonds imply that, as a ¯rst-order





t + Et¢St+1 + ª (6)
where St = logSt and ª is the risk-premium from the variance terms in a Taylor
series expansion of the Euler equations. For simplifying convenience we assume that
the exchange rate is set at Purchasing Power Parity, and that home and foreign goods
are identical. Hence the current account de¯cit is the excess of domestic demand over
output supply; in the long term we assume this de¯cit to be closed by ¯scal policy.
The Representative Firm
The representative ¯rm has two types of buyer for its good: domestic residents
and the rest of the world (to which it may export its good). The technology available





where 0 ¹ ® ¹ 1, Yt is aggregate output, K is capital
stock which is assumed to be ¯xed, Nt is labour supply and Zt re°ects the state of
technology.13; 14 Here, ¯rms operate in competitive markets and therefore take prices
as given when solving their own constrained maximisation problem. Each ¯rms ob-
jective in period `t' is to maximise pro¯t subject to the constant-returns-to-scale
production technology.
Introduction of overlapping non-contingent wage contracts15
In what follows we replace the standard spot labour market with a market char-
acterised by imperfectly °exible wages. It is assumed that the nominal wage is set to
try and maintain equilibrium real wage (i.e., where supply equals demand in expec-
tation). Suppose we have a situation where all wage contracts are set for four periods
and the contracts drawn in period `t' speci¯es nominal wages for periods t+1, t+2,
t+3 and t+4.16 The actual wage rate at any given point in time would be an average
of the wages that have been set at various dates in the past. Hence, nominal wage at
time `t' in natural logarithms would be
Wt = 0:25(t¡1Wt +t¡2 Wt +t¡3 Wt +t¡4 Wt)
or




where w? denotes equilibrium real wage.17 If we let output supply be a declining
11function of the real wage (from ¯rms maximising pro¯ts subject to a production
function with labour inputs and some ¯xed overheads) then one can derive the Phillips












+ ¸0(logYt¡1 ¡ logY
¤) (7)
where q Â 0, ¸0 denotes persistence, N is the contract length Y ? is potential
output; we assume this to be growing at the steady rate `g', while the lagged term
captures persistence due to the capital stock overshooting or undershooting the steady
state growth path.
III Constructing the Taylor pseudo-rule
To construct a relationship that looks like a Taylor rule, or `pseudo-rule', we
substitute for logPt (from our Phillips curve) and substitute (5) for Et logCt+1 in (3)




























12We can now consider how two di®erent money supply reaction functions could be
embedded in (8) to mimic a Taylor rule.18
Two examples: i) The Taylor pseudo-rule when a Friedman rule is operating
First, consider a Friedman money growth rule:19
logMt ¡ logMt¡N = ¹ + "t
(1¡(1¡¸1)L); 0 Á ¸1 Á 1
where ¹ = ¼?+gm (is the k in Friedman's k% rule) is assumed to be split between
an in°ation target, ¼?, and an allowance for growth in real money demand, gm; ¸1
denotes speed of adjustment with which the rule comes back on track, and L is the
lag operator. Substituting the Friedman money growth rule in (8) for logMt yields:
Rt = Á1 + a0(logYt ¡ logY
¤) ¡ b0(¼t ¡ ¼
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+b0°1log e Ct+1 ¡ a0¸0(logYt¡1 ¡logY ¤)
This gives us the pseudo-rule in a simple form. To create a more complex rule
where the lagged interest rate enters we extract the term in lagged real money balance
from the error term and replace it with its value from equation (3) to obtain:
Rt = Á11 + Rt¡1 + a0(logYt ¡logY ¤) ¡b0(¼t ¡¼?) + u2t
13where
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´
¡ a0¸0(logYt¡1 ¡ logY ¤)
We can also write:













log e Ct+1 ¡ log e Ct
´
+ (1 ¡ ½)Rt¡1 ¡a0¸0(logYt¡1 ¡ logY ¤)
Thus we have a full set of dynamic pseudo-rules, with the error and constant term
adjusting according to the dynamics.20 Before proceeding, we brie°y address several
econometric issues. First, our analysis maintains the assumption that a monetary
regime with an in°ation target nominal interest rates will be stationary; hence the
error term will also be stationary. Therefore this pseudo-rule will appear to have a
stationary error term when it is estimated and thus will pass the usual time-series
tests. In addition to its empirical plausibility we would point out that stationarity of
both in°ation and the nominal interest rate is also a property of many of the papers
that rationalize the use of the kind of policy rule considered here. Second, in the
Taylor pseudo-rule the \disturbance" term u1t is not exogenous as it is a composite
of many variables i.e., the orthogonality restrictions will be violated leading to a
14statistical rejection of the model. Instrumental variable estimation would however
remedy this problem. Third, the pseudo-rule in complex form where the lagged
interest rate term enters should help eliminate any serial correlation in the error
term.
ii) The pseudo-rule when the money supply rule targets the exchange rate
Now let us consider a money supply rule which reacts to nominal exchange rate
°uctuations. Exchange rate targeting forces a tightening of monetary policy when
there is a tendency for the domestic currency to depreciate or a loosening of policy
when there is a tendency for the domestic currency to appreciate. As Mishkin [1995]
points out, in an open economy, the exchange rate channel is an essential part of
the transmission mechanism for monetary policy; the exchange rate a®ects the target
variables of monetary policy, in°ation and output gap, in di®erent subchannels, even
though for simplicity we have not included them here. Suppose we specify a money
supply rule of the form:
logMt ¡ logMt¡N = ¹ + ¿Et¢St+1 +
"t
(1¡(1¡¸1)L); ¿ Á 0
then substituting (6) above for Et¢St+1 and the resulting expression in (8) for
logMt yields:
Rt = Á2 + a1(logYt ¡ logY
¤) ¡ b1(¼t ¡ ¼
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If we as above, remove lagged real money balances from the error term and sub-
stitute from equation (3), we obtain:
Rt = Á22 + (
°2
°2¡¿)Rt¡1 + a1(logYt ¡ logY ¤) ¡ b1(¼t ¡ ¼?) + u5t
where













log e Ct+1 ¡ log e Ct
´
¡ a1¸0(logYt¡1 ¡ logY ¤)
The coe±cient on lagged interest rates is greater than unity. But again we can
make it smaller or larger by adjusting the error term and constant term. Note that
the `correlative relation' between the three endogenous variables, Rt, Yt, and ¢Pt
emerges from a macro model with a variety of monetary rules.21 We could go on
in this manner with other money supply rules. Essentially, as these two examples
indicate, we could substitute the contents of a money supply rule for logMt and then
sweep the components that are not in the Taylor rule into the error term or the
constant. What we have shown is that money supply rules give rise to interest rate
behaviour that looks like a Taylor rule. Yet the behaviour of the economy will be
di®erent under these money supply rules from what it would be under the Taylor rule
16they resemble.We demonstrate this for two simple examples in the appendix.
In other words what we are seeing is that all these quite di®erent rules have a
Taylor rule representation. Yet plainly a Taylor rule is operating only in the case
where central bank behaviour is truly governed by such a rule in a structural sense.
Thus the Taylor rule is not identi¯ed - it cannot be distinguished from other regimes
masquerading as a Taylor rule. It follows that the empirical evidence from estimation
of Taylor-style equations will not help discriminate between a Taylor rule and other
sorts of monetary behaviour by the central bank.
IV Conclusion
In a variety of recent papers, researchers have found that interest rate behaviour
approximately follows a Taylor rule. From this they have concluded that the central
bank is following a Taylor rule as its monetary policy reaction function. However, we
have shown in this paper that such interest rate behaviour results when the central
bank may be following quite di®erent monetary policy rules from the one proposed by
Taylor. They include a Friedman rule, an exchange rate rule for money supply, and
a money rule with a feedback from the output gap. In other words an interest rate
relation with output and in°ation does not identify a central bank reaction function.
Other information about the model structure must be used for identi¯cation. In
short, seeing a Taylor Rule in the data should not be believing. Taylor Rules may
be there or may be not, and there may or may not be good theoretical grounds for
17believing in them, but the empirical work to date relating interest rates to output
and in°ation provides no evidence for their existence.
This raises the question: is the Taylor Rule nevertheless a good way to represent
the range of monetary policy behaviour whatever it may be? A number of papers
discussing past monetary policy have proceeded as if this were the case; for example
some have argued that the lax monetary control of in°ation by the US Fed and the
UK government in the 1970s can be represented by a low coe±cient (i.e, well below
unity) on in°ation in a Taylor Rule. However our appendix shows that there can
be no exact equivalence between money supply rules and Taylor Rules; furthermore,
the work reported in Bryant et al. [1993] shows that there are substantial stochastic
di®erences in the behaviour of economies under such di®erent rules. It also shows
that the welfare ranking of these rules is a di±cult matter, depending inter alia on
the stochastic environment and the welfare measure used. One might add that the
vulnerability of the rules to measurement error [eg Orphanides, 1998] on identifying
potential output) and of course, as originally stressed by Taylor, money demand
instability, remains to be properly assessed.
18Appendix
This Appendix illustrates that economic behaviour under a Taylor rule is di®erent
from a feedback rule for money supply, although interest rate behaviour across these
two rules are indistinguishable. To illustrate this we consider a closed-economy model
(for convenience) which tries to preserve our original framework in the text. Following
Taylor [2000] the modi¯ed model to be used in the present section can be expressed
as (in natural logarithms)








+ ¸yt¡1; ±; ¸ Â 0
´ ±(¼t ¡ 0:5fEt¡1¼t + Et¡2¼tg) + ¸yt¡1 (A2)
rt = b1¼t + b2yt; b1; b2 Â 0 (A3)
where "t is a stochastic disturbance, yt is output, and ¼t is the in°ation rate. Here
(A1) is an expectational IS curve, (A3) is a Taylor rule and (A2) is a Phillips curve.
Substituting (A3) in (A1) for rt and substituting the resulting expression for yt in
(A2) yields (where the operator B is de¯ned by B¡1(Ext+j j -t) = Ext+j+1 j -t,
where -t is the information set at time `t', in other words B instructs to lag the






















Note that in a stochastic linear economic system, such as the model we are cur-
rently working with, the solution for the endogenous variable can be written as an
in¯nite moving-average process in a random error. Thus using the method of \unde-









¼ = the mean of the series, si = constant parameters, and " = a normally
distributed error with a mean of 0, constant variance ¾2
" and zero covariance. Thus





























We need to now evaluate s0 and s1 i.e., the undetermined coe±cients. For this
we collect terms in "t, "t¡1, "t¡2 etc. Ignoring the constants results in:











































) si = ¸si¡1
The solution for s0 and s1 can be substituted in (A5) and (A2) in order to get
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Now let us consider a model with a constant rate of growth of the money supply

















Rt = rt + Etpt+1 ¡ pt (B5)
where (B3) is the money demand function, (B4) is the Friedman rule, and (B5)
is the Fisher equation. By straightforward substitution we get (using the solution for

































i=1 qi"t¡i + "t ¡ ¸"t¡1
We need to now evaluate q0 and q1 i.e., the undetermined coe±cients. For this we
collect terms in "t, "t¡1, "t¡2 etc. Ignoring the constants results in:
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is an unstable root. Imposing the
transversality condition that the qi process is stable yields:
) qi = ¸qi¡1















































Clearly the form of the solution with a Taylor rule is the same as the Friedman
rule. But it is impossible for qi = si, as can be seen by comparing the expressions for























a11 : (1 ¡ °¸+ ®b2)± + ®b1 = ±
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a21 : ¡®¸b1 = ¡
®¸(1+¯1)
¯1
a22 : (1 + ®b2)0:5± + ®b1 = 0:5± +
®(1+¯1)
¯1
Note that a21 and a22 imply b1 =
1+¯1
¯1 and b2 = 0. But if so we have from a11;
220 =
±®¯2¸






; these are restrictions on the struc-
tural coe±cients which there is no reason in general to be satis¯ed. Hence the solu-
tions are in general di®erent under the Taylor rule and the money rule even though
a money rule generates a `semi-reduced form' for Rt which resembles a Taylor rule.
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26Notes
1. For example, the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank now publishes an interest rate rule that
John Taylor proposed.
2. In the remainder of this paper, this class of similar rules will be referred to as Taylor-type
rules to distinguish them from the original Taylor rule.
3. In this spirit, Clarida et al. [1998, 2000] estimate a forward looking rule for Bundesbank,
Bank of Japan, and the Federal Reserve.
4. Sargent (1976) in an important paper demonstrated that the reduced form for output in a
Keynesian model, in which systematic monetary policy will in°uence the variance of output, may be
statistically indistinguishable from that of a classical model in which only unanticipated movements
in the money stock impact on output.
5. The following analysis is based on McCallum and Goodfriend [1987] in which
Mt
Pt is interpreted
as end-of-period real money balances. In addition we would point out that in several recent papers,
it is assumed that end-of-period money balances are relevant for facilitating transactions. See, for
example McCallum and Nelson [1999].
6. In order to rule out a strategy of in¯nite consumption supported by unbounded borrowing,

















Yt+j + At, where Rt is the
(gross) interest rate, At denotes ¯nancial wealth (bonds and shares in our set up) and Yt denotes
labour (and dividend) income:The above equation is a standard budget constraint for an in¯nitely-
27lived household in discrete time. It is motivated as an additional necessary restriction, in addition
to the static household budget constraint in equation (2), that obviates Ponzi strategies.
7. As Barro and King [1984] point out, preference ordering (time-separable) of this form would
not restrict the sizes of intertemporal substitution e®ects. We do not claim that separability is
theoretically an appropriate assumption. However, we believe that for the present purpose such
an approximation will be satisfactory. Such approximations are certainly quite common in the
literature.


























9. Equations(3) and (4) involve certain standard ¯rst-order approximations, arising from passing
nonlinear functions through the linear expectations operator.
10. Where we use a common approximation (log(1 + x) ' x for `x' small relative to 1.0).
11. In this general equilibrium framework we introduce a government that spends current output
according to a non negative stochastic process(Gt) that satis¯esGt ¹ Yt for all t. The government















The variable Gt denotes government expenditure at time t. The government ¯nances its ex-






each of which pays a return next period given the state of the economy at t+1.
2812. We thus have a relation expressing real money balances as a function of (future) consumption
spending and the nominal rate of interest. Similarly the expression for consumption (5) is in line with
developments in contemporary macroeconomic research which suggests the dependence of current
consumption on expected future consumption and the short-term real rates.
13. We assume that f(N, K) is smooth and concave and it satis¯es Inada-type conditions.
14. The ¯rm optimally chooses capital and labour so that their marginal products are equal to









Capital stock is assumed to be ¯xed because we are interested in the derivation of short run
aggregate supply. If we assume that f (¢) = N®
t K
1¡®
i.e., a Cobb-Douglas function, then we can
express the demands for the two factors as a function of the optimal output choice i.e.,
Nt =
®Yt
wt and K =
(1¡®)Yt
rt
In order to solve for the optimal choice of output we substitute Nt into the Cobb-Douglas
production function which essentially yields the supply function of the ¯rm, where output supply is
a declining function of the real wage.
15. For a lucid exposition of this topic see Minford (1992).
16. Note that at any given point in time three-fourth's of the labour force is covered by a
pre-existing contract. The assumption of rational expectations here entails that the forecast of the
next period wage decisions is an unbiased one, given that agents possess the necessary information
set.
2917. Note that;
t¡iWt = w? + Et¡iPt where i = 1; 4: Ideally the equilibrium real wage is a time-varying
constant i.e., it would move with taste and technology shocks. Treating w? as a constant here does
not in anyway a®ect our ¯nal conclusion.
18. If in principle separate estimates of each of these structural parameters can be disentangled
from the corresponding economic data, we say that the model is statistically identi¯ed. When this is
not possible, a given data sample is consistent with an in¯nity of di®erent structural models which
are said to be observationally equivalent, since it is impossible to distinguish between them.
19. Srinivasan et al. [2000] show that the Taylor rule is an implication of Friedman rule and a
representative agent model with overlapping wage contracts.
20. Note that if we replace our Fischer style Phillips curve by the widely-used Calvo-Rotemberg
Phillips curve, none of our conclusion are a®ected. We would have expected future in°ation instead
of expected current in°ation appearing in the error term.
21. As Taylor [1999] points out, a function relating the interest rate to the price level and real
output will emerge under a variety of monetary regimes, however, the magnitude of the response
coe±cients (ai and bi in our case) will di®er depending on how monetary policy is run. The size of
these coe±cients makes a big di®erence for the e®ect of policy.
30